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Market Discipline of Bank
Risk: Theory and Evidence
ECAUSE of the many failures of banks and
thrift institutions in recent years and the high
cost of liquidating or reorganizing the bankrupt
savings and loan associations, policymakers are
now considering major changes in the way they
supervise and regulate depository institutions in
the United States. The Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
which provides the funds for closing bankrupt
savings and loan associations (S&.Ls), calls for
several government agencies to study the issues
involved.1 The federal budget document for fis-
cal 1991 discusses the basis for reform of
deposit insurance and the advantages of various
reforms.2
To some extent, the unusually high failure
rate of depository institutions (hereafter called
banks) can be attributed to developments in the
economy such as declines in the prices of oil
and farmland in the early 1980s. Some studies
conclude that fraud and mismanagement ac-
count for many of the bank failures.~The gen-
eral consensus, however, is that deposit insur-
ance creates an incentive for banks to assume
higher risk than they would without it. Such
risk may be gauged in terms of the variance of
a bank’s return on assets as a percentage of its
capital. The logic that underlies this consensus
is that without deposit insurance, banks that
choose portfolios of assets with higher variance
in their rates of return, or lower ratios of capi-
tal to total assets, would have to pay higher in-
terest rates on deposits. Deposit insurance
blunts this penalty. The relatively high failure
rate and losses of the deposit insurance funds
reflect, to some extent, the banks’ response to
the incentives to assume risk created by deposit
insurance. Thus, a major issue in the debates
over financial reform is the future role of de-
posit insurance.
Some recent proposals to reform deposit in-
surance are designed to increase the effective-
ness of market forces in reducing the risk
assumed by banks. Under these proposals, bank
owners and creditors would be exposed to
larger losses if their banks fail. The theory is
that if bank owners and creditors have greater
exposure to losses, they will limit the risk as-
sumed by their banks. In some proposals, this
influence would complement the efforts of bank
supervisors. In others, market discipline would
replace government supervision.
‘Title X of the act directs the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Comptroller General, in consultation with various
federal government agencies and individuals from the
private sector, to prepare reports on issues related to the
reform of deposit insurance, including the implications of
policies that would enhance the effectiveness of market
discipline.
2Budget (1990), pp. 246-53.
3Graham and Homer (1988) and Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (1988).This paper describes some of these proposals
for enhancing the effectiveness of market disci-
pline and illustrates how they would affect the
banks incentive to assume risk. The paper also
examines the empirical evidence on the effective-
ness of market discipline. Proposals for the re-
form of deposit insurance that rely on market
discipline assume that market participants can
differentiate among banks on the basis of risk,
and that market yields on bank debt reflect that
risk. The paper lists the results of several em-
pirical studies and draws conclusions about the
potential effectiveness of these proposals in re-
forming deposit insurance.
Various approaches to enhancing the effec-
tiveness of market discipline of bank risk are
presented in table 1. choosing one approach
over another depends in part on which basic
objective of deposit insurance is considered to
be most important.
The following are the primary objectives of
deposit insurance:
1. To protect depositors with small accounts,
2. To prevent widespread runs by depositors on
banks, and
3. To protect the insurance fund from losses
that would bankrupt it.~
There are tradeoffs among these objectives.
The policy that provides the greatest protection
against runs by depositors is complete coverage
of all deposit accounts. That policy, however,
eliminates any incentive for depositors to exert
their discipline over the risk assumed by their
banks, leading perhaps to an increase in the in-
surance fund’s losses.
The dollar limit on the amount in each ac-
count that is insured, currently $100,000,
reflects an attempt to balance these objectives.
Total coverage of accounts less than $100,000
protects small depositors. The limit on the in-
surance coverage per account is designed to in-
duce the depositors with large accounts to
monitor their banks and require that riskier
banks pay higher interest rates on their de-
posits. Those with relatively large accounts are
assumed to be better able to impose such mar-
ket discipline. The limit on insurance coverage
Table 1
Proposals to Increase the
Effectiveness of Market Discipline
of Bank Risk
(1) Phase out federal deposit insurance to facilitate the
development and use of private deposit insurance.
Short and O’Driscoll (1983). Ely(1985). England (1985~
and Smith (1988).
(2) Lower the ceiling on federal ir1suran~e coverage per
account. Council of Economic Advisers (1989). pp.
203-4
(3) Co-insurance, limit federal deposit insurance to some
fraction of each account Boyd and Rolnick (1988)
(4) Place a ceiling on federal deposit insurance per in-
dividual at all depository institutions. England (1988)
(5) All institutions must maintain subordinated debt
liabilities that are some fraction of their total assets.
Cooper and Fraser (1988). Keehn (1989) and Wall
(1989).
(6) Early closure: close or reorganize depository institu-
tions wnen iheir capital ratios, reflecting the market
value of assets and liabilities, are low but still positive.
This proposal is designed to enhance the effeotivenoss
of market discipline by closing or reorganizing banks
whose shareholders have weak incentive to limit rrsks.
Benston and Kaufman (1988).
per account, however, tends to undermine the
objective of preventing runs by depositors on
the banking system.
Of course, a run by depositors on an in-
dividual bank does not create a serious problem
for the banking system, because these depositors
simply remove their cash from one bank and
deposit it in another in which they have more
confidence. If the bank subject to the run can-
not meet its depositors’ demand for currency, it
will have to close. Its depositors will be paid as
the assets of the failed bank are liquidated. A
run on a bank can serve a useful purpose—a
mechanism for closing a bank in which deposi-
tors have lost confidence.
Runs become a problem for the banking
system, however, when depositors withdraw
currency and, hence, reserves from banks as a
group. Banking history in the United States and
~Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1983), pp. viii-xiii.the United Kingdom prior to their central banks
acting as lenders of last resort indicates that
runs on banking systems have occurred, al-
though they tended to be separated by many
years.5
Some argue that deposit insurance is not
necessary to avoid the adverse social effects of
banking system runs. They maintain that, as long
as the central bank acts as an effective lender
of last resort, the liquidity it provides would
limit any damage that runs on individual banks
could do.°An alternative view emphasizes the
dangers of relying on the central bank to
operate as the lender of last resort to a banking
system without deposit insurance. A central
bank might respond inappropriately in a finan-
cial crisis, as the Federal Reserve did in the ear-
ly 1930s, leading to rapid declines in the assets
of the banking system and widespread bank
failures. Deposit insurance reduces the role of
the central bank in maintaining stability in the
operation of the banking system. Thus, the
choice among the potential reforms of deposit
insurance rests on views about the vulnerability
of the banking system to runs and the effec-
tiveness of a lender of last resort in dealing
with runs.
If the primary objectives of deposit insurance
are to protect small depositors and to protect
the insurance funds from large losses, a logical
change would be to reduce the insurance cover-
age per account. This was proposed by the Pre-
sident’s Council of Economic Advisers in 1989.
Those who consider the possibility of banking
system runs a serious threat to the stability of
the banking system would oppose a large reduc-
tion in the insurance coverage on bank deposits.
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The reform proposals are designed to reduce
the incentives for banks to assume risk. In
evaluating their effectiveness, it is useful to con-
sider three indicators of the banking system’s
performance that reflect this risk: the expected
loss by depositors due to the bank failure, the
expected loss of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the probability that a
bank will fail. The expected loss by depositors
and the FDIC are considered separately since
proposals that reduce the FDIC’s expected loss
tend to increase the expected loss by depositors.
Focusing on only one of these measures of per-
formance misses some of the reform proposals’
implications. The third measure, the probability
of bank failures, is of interest because of evi-
dence that bank failures have adverse effects on
economic activity in addition to the wealth
losses by depositors and owners.7 The studies
that find adverse effects of bank failures on
economic activity attribute those effects to the
constraints on the availability of credit created
by bank failures.
The proposals’ implications for the effective-
ness of market discipline can best be derived by
using a model of the behavior of banks and
their creditors.~
The implications of the various reform pro-
posals are derived by examining the effects of
proposed changes in deposit insurance on the
optimal choice of risk by a representative bank-
er. Several assumptions are made to simplify
the model.
— The only ran-
dom variable in the model is the rate of return
on assets of the representative bank, which has
the same probability distribution under all as-
sumptions about the nature of deposit in-
surance. Bank regulators are assumed to deter-
mine the probability distribution of the rate of
return by restricting the types of assets the
bank may hold. The only choice for the repre-
sentative banker in this model is the level of the
bank’s total assets. The capital of the bank is
held constant at $100 in each case. With a given
level of capital and a given probability distribu-
tion of the rate of return on assets, the proba-
bility of failure (losses exceeding capital) is posi-
tively related to the total assets of the bank.
Management is assumed to choose the level of
5Gitbert and Wood (1986) and Dwyer and Gilbert (1989).
6See Kaufman (1988) and Schwartz (1988).
7See Bernanke (1983), Calomiris, Hubbard and Stock
(1986), Grossman (1989), and Gilbert and Kochin (1989).
8To illustrate the need for such a model, consider a basic
reform of eliminating deposit insurance. That change
would increase the interest expense of a bank with a given
portfolio of assets, thereby tending to increase its pro-
bability of failure. The penalty of higher interest expense
imposed by depositors on those banks that assume more
risk would induce banks to assume tess risk in their
choice of assets. The net effect of eliminating deposit in-
surance on the probability of bank failure must be derived
from a theoretical model that specifies the risk preferences
of depositors and bank managers.total assets that maximizes the expected profits
of the bank.
With a given level of bank capital, the condi-
tions under which the bank fails can be derived
only with a specific probability distribution of
return on assets. This paper uses the discrete
probability distribution presented in table 2.~
For each of the seven possible outcomes, the
rate of return on assets is net of the operating
cost of servicing the assets.
‘rhe rate of return associated with each out-
come is assumed to be inversely related to the
size of the bank’s total assets. One reason for
this assumption of an inverse relationship is
that, as the bank increases its total assets, it
must lend to borrowers beyond the local area
in which it has some market power. Another
reason is diseconomies of scale in the operating
cost of servicing assets. For each outcome with
a positive return on assets, therefore, the rate
of return falls as total assets increase. This
feature of the model yields a maximum ex-
pected profit for the bank under each assump-
tion about deposit insurance.10
— For a given level of total
assets, the bank’s cost depends on the insurance
coverage on its liabilities. This paper considers
the four cases described below. If, as in case A,
all deposits are fully insured, the bank can at-
tract an unlimited supply of deposits by paying
the risk-free rate of interest. Under each of the
four assumptions about deposit insurance, the
costs of servicing deposit accounts are offset by
fees charged to depositors.
For a given level of total assets, the highest
expense occurs in case II, with no deposit in-
surance. In this case, the interest rate that the
bank must pay on deposits is positively related
to its total assets. Depositors are assumed to he
risk-neutral and to know the probability distri-
bution of the bank’s return on assets. Hence,
the bank must pay the rate to depositors that
makes their expected return on deposits equal
to the risk-free rate.”
The interest rate that the bank pays deposi-
tors is above the risk-free rate if the bank fails
in at least one of the seven possible outcomes.
If it fails, the depositors receive the liquidation
value of the bank’s assets. Liquidation value in
those outcomes reflects the probability distribu-
tion of the bank’s return on assets. There is no
additional loss to depositors resulting from the
elimination of the bank as a going concern.12
The equation for calculating the rate paid to
depositors in case B is presented in table 2.
Cases C and D reflect two methods of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of market discipline of
bank risk, while retaining some form of deposit
insurance. Co-insurance in case C limits deposit
insurance coverage to 90 percent of each de-
posit account.” In case D, deposits are fully in-
sured, but each bank is required to keep its
9The use of a discrete probability distribution, with a limited
number of outcomes, makes the presentation simpler than
if a continuous probability distribution was used. In using a
discrete probability distribution, there is a trade-off be-
tween simplicity and continuity of the probability of failure
with respect to leverage. The smatter the number of possi-
ble outcomes, the larger the jumps in the probability of
failure at certain asset levels. Increasing the number of
possible outcomes, however, increases the difficulty of il-
lustrating the calculations. Thus, the probability distribution
in table 2 is arbitrary.
‘°Themodel abstracts from possible tosses by our represen-
tative bank on the deposits it holds at other banks. If a
reform proposal increases the probability of losses on in-
terbank deposits, the effects of such reform proposals on
the probability of failure at our representative bank would
be understated.
This point about possible loss on interbank deposits is
most relevant in comparing the case with no deposit in-
surance to the other cases examined below. The model in
this paper is not modified to reflect directly the effects of
possible losses on interbank deposits.
This model also ignores losses from runs on the bank
by its depositors in reaction to the failure of other banks. If
deposit insurance coverage is reduced or eliminated, the
failure of some banks may induce depositors to run on
other banks to receive currency in exchange for their
deposits. Several such episodes occurred in the United
States prior to the establishment of deposit insurance in
the 1930s, See Dwyer and Gilbert (1989). To incorporate
the possible effects of runs, the probability distribution of
the return on assets at the representative bank would have
to be specified as a function of the number of bank
failures.
“The general nature of the comparisons among the four
cases would not be changed if depositors were assumed
to be risk averse,
‘2The assumption that a bank’s assets lose no value when
they are liquidated results in an understatement of the ex-
pected loss of depositors and bank creditors in the various
cases. A study by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, Bovenzi and Murton (1988), reports that when the
FDIC liquidates the assets of failed banks, their liquidation
value averages about 70 percent of the book value of the
assets of failed banks.
“Boyd and Rolnick (1988) suggest 90 percent coverage of
deposits in their proposal for a form of co-insurance in
deposit insurance.Table 2
A Model of Bank Profits
NET REVENUE
Revenue of the bank net of the operating cost of servicing assets, is a :andom var~abIew’th a
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COST
The cost of the bank s not a ranoom variable It is the same in each of the seven outcomes Ex-
pected orofits are calculateo br four cases, each involving a different assumption about the in-
terest expense of the bank In those outcomes in which the bank has a loss, the maximum loss
to the snareholders is therr investment of $~00.
Case A: All Liabilities Fully Insured
The bank pays the risk-free rate of 8 pc-cent on deposits. whicn equal A -- $100
Case B: No Deposit Insurance
At each level of toial assets of the bank. the interest rate on deposits is set at the
level that makes the expected return to holders ot uninsur~de~sitsequal to tne
risk-free rate of 8 percent.
The ;nterest rate on deposits in case B. for a given level of assets. can be derived by solving the
tollowing equation for R. the interest rate or, deposits To economize on notation., let
= ~1 — Al10.000~A.Then.
1 08(A 100) =
0.01(1 +R)(A-100). or
001(1 4A) it 0.4A — R~A-100)< —100
± 0.04(1 ,.R~(A—10o).or
004~13A’lif03A — R~A—100~ < -100
+ 01(1 + R~A -.100). or
0.1(1 2A) ‘f 0,2A’ — R~A --100) c - 100
07(1 — RgA —1001. or
07(1 1A) itO 1A - RfA— 100) < —100
+ 0.1(1 + R)(A 100), or
01(A)1 —R(A—100) < —100
= 0.04(1 +R)(A --100). or
004(09A)if -alA’ — R(A..100) .c —100
~ 0.01(1 — Ri(A— 100), or
0.01(0 8A) if —0,2A R(A— 100) < —‘00Table 2 continued
A Model of Bank Profits
Case C: ~o-uisurance
The calculation of the stated interest rate on deposits as in case B is modified by settinq the
minimum return to depositors in each outcome at 90 percent of their principal plus stated
interest.
The equation for the interest rate on deposits ‘s the same as that presented for case B except
that in each of the seven possible outcomes. the return to the depositors can be no less than
09(1+R)tA — 100).
Case D: Subordinated Debt Requirement
The bank :s required to have liabilities that are uninsured and subordinated to
deposits. equal to at least 10 percent of its total assets. Deposits are fully insured
The interest rate on deposits is 8 percent. The ‘nterest rate on subordinated debt.
for a given level of assets. can be derived by solving the foltowing equation for R
1.08(0.1)(A) =
0.01(1 +R)0.1A, or
if 0.4A’ - R(0.IA) — 0 08(0.9A— 100) .c —100.
0.01 (the greater of 1 4A — 1 08(0 9A— 100) or zero)
+ 004(1 ~- R)0,1A, or
if 0 3A’ R(0 IA) — 0 08(0,9A-- 100) .c —100,
004 (the greater of 1 3A .- 1 08f0.9A -100) or zero)
01(1 ~R)0 1A, or
if 0 2A — R(0 1A) — 0.08(0 9A— 100) ‘C ‘ 100.
o i (the greater of l,2A’ - 1 08(0.9A ‘100) or zero)
0.7(l--R~0.1A.or
if O,1A - R~0 IA) -- 0 08(0.9A - 100) < —100,
07 (the greater ot I 1A — 1.08f0 9A —100) or zero,)
i-C 1fl-i-R)0.1A, or
if —RfO 1A) — 0.0B(0.9A 100) c -.100.
0 1 (the greater of A’ — 1 ,0B~0.9A — 1001 or zero)
+ 0 04(1 -i-R)o 1A or
if 0 1A — R(0.1A) — 008(0 9A —100) < 100,
0.04 (the greater of 0 9A — 1 08(0 9A — 100) or zero)
+ 001(1’-R)OlA or
if —0,2A . RfO 1A,) ‘ 0,08i0 9A --100) < —100
001 ~thcgreater of 0 8A’ — 1 08(0 9A— iorn o~zero)subordinated debt liabilities equal to 10 percent
or more of its total assets.14
In cases C and D, the interest rates on bank
liabilities also are set at levels that make ex-
pected returns to bank creditors equal to the
risk-free rate. Equations for calculating the in-
terest rates on bank liabilities are specified in
table 2.
Other reform proposals are of interest but are
more difficult to incorporate into this simple
model. For instance, more detail would be ne-
cessary to model the effects of changing the
deposit insurance limit per account or limiting
FDIC coverage for each depositor to a given




The bank maximizes expected profits in this
case with total assets around $1800 (see figure
1). At this level, the bank fails (losses exceed the
$100 of capital) in outcomes 5, 6 and 7. ‘I’hus,
the probability that the bank will fail is 15 per-
cent, based on the probability distribution for
the return on assets in table 2. The FDIC’s ex-
pected loss, $14.26, is about 0.84 percent of in-
sured deposits. The expected loss of depositors,
of course, is zero.
(j~u~:~ .[‘J~ifJ~:it .h1sn.r~.I~n,t
Several reform proposals call for phasing out
deposit insurance (see table 1). With no deposit
insurance, depositors lose part of their principal
plus interest if the bank fails (if losses exceed
the $100 of capital). The interest rate on de-
posits charged by risk-neutral depositors is
positively related to the bank’s total assets (see
figure 2).
The bank maximizes its expected profits with
total assets equal to $1,000. It fails only in out-
comes B and 7. Thus, the probability that the
bank will fail is only 5 percent, compared with
a 15 percent probability of failure associated
with maximum profits in case A. Case B illus-
trates how a bank that maximizes expected pro-
fits can be induced to limit its probability of
failure through market discipline imposed by its
creditors.
The FDIC’s expected loss in this case is zero.
The expected loss of depositors with total assets
equal to $1000 is $4.21, which is about one-half
of one percent of deposits.
Under the co-insurance option, federal deposit
insurance coverage would be limited to a frac-
tion of each deposit, with some low level of
each account fully covered to protect small de-
positors. Those who advocate co-insurance
argue that the depositors subject to fractional
coverage at the margin would monitor the risk
assumed by their banks and demand relatively
high interest rates on deposits at the banks that
assume relatively high risk.
To simplify the illustration, all deposit ac-
counts are subject to the same percentage of in-
surance coverage. In those outcomes in which
the bank fails, payments to depositors under the
co-insurance option would be the larger of:
(1) the liquidation value of the bank’s assets,
or
(2) 90 percent of the principal plus interest on
their deposits. The FDIC incurs a loss only
if the bank fails and the liquidation value
of the bank is less than 90 percent of the
principal plus interest on deposits.
As in case B, the market interest rate on
deposits is set at the level that makes the ex-
pected return on deposits equal to 8 percent.
The difference in this case is that depositors
have the option of receiving 90 percent of their
principal plus interest from the FDIC if their
banks fail. Figure 2 indicates that for a given
level of total assets, the market interest rate on
deposits is lower in case C than in case B,
because in case C the losses of depositors are
limited by deposit insurance.
Under the assumptions of case C, the bank
maximizes expected profits with total assets of
$1100. The bank must pay 8.44 percent to at-
tract the $1000 in deposits. With assets of
$1100, the probability of the bank failing is 5
percent. The FDIC’s expected loss is only 0.072
percent of insured deposits, about 9 percent of
“Case D involves a higher percentage of subordinated debt
to total assets than some of the proposals that call for
subordinated debt requirements. For instance, the recent
proposal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago recom-
mends that banks be required to maintain a 4 percent
ratio of subordinated debt to total assets. See Keehn
(1989). The 10 percent requirement in case Di schosen to
indicate that the degree of market discipline that can be
imposed through a co-insurance proposal can be matched



































Assetsthe loss rate for case A, with total assets at
$1800. The expected loss to depositors is $5.09,
which is about one-half of one percent of total
deposits.
From the FDIC’s perspective, there are two
advantages of co-insurance (case C) over full
deposit insurance (case A). First, the bank
chooses a level of assets associated with a lower
probability of failure. Second, for a given level
of total assets of the bank, the FDIC’s expected
loss is lower under case C.’5
Some proposals for deposit insurance reform
would require banks to issue subordinated debt
liabilities that are not federally insured. The
term “subordinated” refers to the status of
creditors of a firm in bankruptcy. If a failed
bank is liquidated, those who hold subordinated
debt would receive payments only if all deposi-
tors are paid in full.
In case D, all deposits are fully insured by the
FDIC. The bank, however, must have uninsured
liabilities, which are subordinated to deposits,
that equal at least 10 percent of its total assets.
The bank would choose to keep subordinated
debt liabilities at the 10 percent minimum since,
except at relatively low levels of total assets, the
interest rate on subordinated debt exceeds the
risk-free rate paid on insured deposits.
As in cases B and C, those who invest in
subordinated debt are assumed to be risk-
neutral and know the probability distribution of
the net return on assets. Figure 3 presents the
interest rate on subordinated debt as a function
of the total assets of the bank.” For most levels
of total assets, the interest rates on subor-
dinated debt is higher than the rates on
deposits in the cases analyzed earlier because
the expected loss is higher for those holding
subordinated debt. If the bank’s losses exceed
the $100 investment of the shareholders,
holders of the subordinated debt receive some
payment only if the liquidation value of the
bank exceeds total deposits.
The bank maximizes expected profits with
total assets equal to $1100. At that level, the
bank must pay 12.12 percent on its subordi-
nated debt liabilities. The FDIC incurs losses
only if the loss of the bank exceeds the $100
capital of the shareholders plus the subordi-
nated debt. The bank has a 5 percent probabili-
ty of failure, and the expected loss of the FDIC
with total assets equal to $1100 is 0.06 percent
of insured deposits. Depositor losses are zero.
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A comparison of risk in the operation of the
banking system under various assumptions
depends on one’s assumption about the pro-
bability of runs on the banking system. if this
probability is assumed to be zero, the elimina-
tion of deposit insurance (case B) induces banks
to assume minimum risk. The FDIC’s expected
loss is zero in this case, and the bank is induced
by market forces to choose the lowest level of
total assets. One advantage of the subordinated
debt requirement over the other options is that,
while the bank is induced to choose a level of
total assets below that in case A, the subor-
dinated debt is not subject to runs. Thus, the
comparison of risk between cases A and D does
not depend on assumptions about runs on the
banking system.
“Co-insurance, however, has one disadvantage. A change
from full coverage of insured deposits to co-insurance
creates an incentive for depositors to run on banks in
response to information (or rumors) about problems at
banks, Even with the FDIC insuring 90 percent of the prin-
cipal and interest of deposit accounts, depositors have an
incentive to avoid the 10 percent loss by withdrawing their
deposits from a failing bank. Thus, in comparing cases A
and C, co-insurance reduces the significance of deposit in-
surance in preventing runs on the banking system, placing
greater responsibility on the role of the Federal Reserve in
stabilizing the banking system in a financial crisis, as it
functions as the lender of last resort. If there is some
doubt that the Federal Reserve will execute its role as
lender of last resort, co-insurance may be less advan-
tageous than full insurance of deposits.
“The humped pattern of the interest rate on subordinated
debt for case D in figure 3 reflects the particular discrete
probability distribution of returns on the assets used in this
paper. With a continuous probability distribution, or a
discrete distribution with more possible outcomes, the plot
of the interest rate as a function of total assets would have
a tess humped pattern.
The fact that the interest rate on subordinated debt is
higher at higher levels of total assets of the bank might in-
dicate a way in which the management of the bank could
take advantage of those who invest in subordinated debt,
The bank could issue some subordinated debt at a low
level of total assets, at a relatively low interest rate, and
then increase total assets and issue more subordinated
debt at a higher rate. Investors in subordinated debt can
protect themselves from such actions by insisting on
covenants in the subordinated debt agreements that limit
additional debt. If management of the bank violates such a
covenant, the holders of the subordinated debt could go to
court to make their debt instruments payable on demand.
Restrictions on the issuance of additional debt are com-
mon in bond covenants. See Smith and Warner (1979).Figure 3
Market Interest Rate on Bank Liabilities
The co-insurance option is not superior under
any combination of assumptions. If the possibili-
ty of runs on the banking system can be ruled
out, there is a subordinated debt requirement
that induces the same degree of market disci-
pline of banking risk as co-insurance.
Market forces will be effective in constraining
the risk assumed by banks only if investors can
assess the relative degrees of risk assumed by
individual banks, and then set differential prices
on the stock and debt instruments issued by
banks that reflect their information about risk.
The results of the studies described in table 3
are relevant in evaluating the effectiveness of
market discipline. These studies estimate the in-
fluence of measures of risk assumed by banks
on the stock prices of banks and on the market
interest rates on uninsured deposits and the
subordinated debt of banks.” These studies do
not test the hypothesis that banks adjust their
risk in response to signals from the markets for
bank stocks and debt.”
All but one of these studies report evidence
that is consistent with the hypothesis that stock
prices are inversely related to the risk assumed
“The studies described in this section include only those
based on data for individual banking organizations. Some
studies cited in the literature estimate indices of returns on
share prices or interest rates on bank liabilities for groups
of banks as functions of aggregate data on banking risk,
Such results are not relevant in determining whether par-
ticipants in the equity and debt markets can distinguish
among the banking organizations, which would be
necessary if market discipline of bank risk were to be
effective.
18Gendreau and Humphrey (1980) claim to have developed
a model in which there is feedback from adverse signals
in the bank equity market to bank leverage. It is difficult to
see a feedback relationship between the stock price and
leverage in this study, since the relationships among stock
prices, leverage and other variables are estimated using
contemporaneous observations. Estimating a feedback
relationship from market signals to variables under the
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Authors Relationships estimated Results discipline -
MARKET FOR BANK EQUITY
Beighley. Boyd Share prices of bank stocks estimated Holding constant the influence 0t earn- Yes
and Jacobs as a function of (1) capital ratios, ings banks with higher capital rat~os and
(1975) (2) earnings and growth of earnings, lower loss rates tend to have higher
(3) asset size, and (4) toss rates, share prices
Pettway (1976) Betas for individual banks (a measure The coefficient on the capital ratio is Yes
of risk derived from stock prices) esti- negative for one year but insignrf~cantfor
mated as a function of the capital ratios other years. The negative coefficient on
of individual banks. the capital ratio indicates that investors
consider banks with higher capital ratios
to be less risky.
Pettway (1980) For several large banks Ihat failed. On average, returns on the stocks of Yes
returns to shareholders are simulated banks that failed declined relative to
for several years prior to their failure. simulated returns two years before
Simulations are based on returns from failure.
holding stocks of large banks that did
not fail
Brewer and Lee Betas for individual banks are estimated Some of the measures chosen to reflect Yes
(1986) as functions of ratios from balance risk have positive, significant regres-
sheets and income statements used sion coefficients.
by bank supervisors to reflect risk,
Cornell and Returns to shareholders of 43 large The percentage that Latin American Yes
Shapiro (1986) banks are estimated as functions loans was of total assets had a signi-
of the composition of their assets and ficant, negative impact on returns in
liabilities in tne years 1982-83. 1982 Energy loans had a negative
impact in 19B2-83. Loans purchased
from Penn Square Bank had a negative
impact on returns n the month in
which that bank failed,
Shome, Smith Prices of bank stocks are estimated as a The coefficient on the capital ratio is Yes
and Heggestad function of its earnings and capital positive and significant for some years.
(1986) ratios, insignificant for other years.
Smirlock and Changes in stock prces of large Coefficient on the ratio of Mexican Yes
Kaufold (1987j banks at the ttme of the announce- debt to equity capital is negative and sig-
ment by Mexico in 1982 of its mora- nificant, Banks were not required to
toriurn on debt payments as a function disclose their Mexican debt at the time
of the ‘atro of Mexican debt to equity of the 1982 moratorium
capital at indivioual banks,Table 3 continued






Authors Relationships estimated Results discipline
MARKET FOR BANK EQUITY continued
James (1989) Returns on holding the stock of BHCs The change in the market value of Yes
and Cargill estimated as a function of the change loans to less-developed countries has a
(1989) in the market value of the BH~s’ loans positive, significant coefficient which is
to less-developed countrres and dum- nor significantly different from unity.
my variables for individual banks and
individual time penods.
Randall (1989) Tnis is a case study of 40 BHC5 that Stocks prices ot the BHCs that re- No
reported relatively large losses in the ported relatively large losses declined
1980s For each BH~.a time period relative to market average stock prices
is destgnated when it began assuming only after the problems became public
relatively high risk and a time period knowledqe, not during the periods
when problems became public know- which the banks began assuming
ledge Stock prices are compared to relatively high rrsk,
market averages before and after the
problems oecame puolic knowledge
MARKET FOR UNINSURED DEPOSITS
The interest rale on large denomination certificates of deposit is the dependent
variable in each study
Crane (1976) Identifies the determinants of the CD rhe factor that reflects profit rates and No
ra’e us;nq factor analysis. capital ratios is not a significant vari-
able in explaining the CD rate.
Herzig~Marx and Estimates CD rates as a function ot Of bank risk variables, only the liquidi- No
Weaver (1979) variables used by bank supervisors to ty measure has a significant coefficient.
reflect risk, Capital and loss ratios have insignifi-
cant coefficients
Baer and Brewer CD rate estimated as a function of ~oofficrents on risk measures used by No
(19861 variables used by bank supervisors to bank supervisors are not significant
reflect risk, and separately. as ~unc- Measures of the level and variability of
tions of level and variability of the stock prices help explain CD rates.
prices of bank stocks
James f1987i The average .nterest ‘ates paid by 58 Each of tnese measures of risk have Yes
large banks on their iaroe denomina- postive. significant coeffcients
tion deposits are estimated as func-
eons of leverage, loan loss provision
divided oy total loans and tne variance
of stock returns
Hannan and CD rate is estimateO as a function of (1) These three va’iahles have significant Yes
Hanweck t1988 the varability of the ratio of ‘ncorne to coeff’cients CD rates tend to be hiqher
assets. (2) the capitai ratio and ~3)bank at banks with more variable income and
assets lowe’ capital ratios, holding constant
the influence of total assetsTable 3 continued
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MARKET FOR UNINSURED DEPOSITS continued
James (1969) Interest cost on large CDs estimated Interest cost positively related to the Yes
as a function of risk measures. domestic ratio of domestic loans to capital and
loans/capital, foreign loans/capital and the lean loss provision. The negative
the loan toss provision/total loans, relation between interest cost and the
ratio of foreign loans to capital is inter-
preted as evidence of an implicit
government guarantee of foreign loans.
MARKET FOR SUBORDINATED DEBT:
In each study the measure of the interest rate on the subordinated debt of banks is
the rate on the subordinated debt minus the rate on long-term U.S. Treasury
securities, called the rate premium,
Pettway (1976) The rate premium is estimated as a The coefficient on the capital ratio is No
function of the capital ratio of banks not significant.
and other independent variables,
Beighley (1977) The rate premium is estimated as a The coefficients on the loss and lever- Yes
function of several measures of risk, age ratios are positive and significant
including a less ratio and a leverage
ratio.
Fraser and The rate premium is estimated as a Neither independent variable has a No
McCormack function of the capital ratio and the significant coefficient
(1978) variability of profits divided by total
assets,
Herzig-Marx The rate premium is estimated as a None of the risk measures have signi- No
(1979) function of several measures of risk ficant coefficients,
assumed by banks.
Avery. Belton The rate premium is estimated as a Coefficients on the risk measures do- No
and Goldberg function of risk measures derived from rived from balance sheets and income
(1988) balance sheets and income statements statements are not significant.
and of the asset size of banks,
Gorton and Use data in Avery, Belton and Goldberq Some of the risk measures derived Yes
Santemero (1988) to derive a measure of the van- from the balance sheets and income
(1988) ance of assets of banks implied by a statements have significant coefficients,
contingent claims valuation model. The
measure of the variance of assets is
estimated as a function of the risk
measures derived from balance sheets
and income statements,by banks, holding constant other determinants
of stock prices. The one study that concludes
that stock prices do not reflect the risk assumed
by banks, by Randall (1989), examines move-
ments in the stock prices of bank holding com-
panies that reported relatively large losses in
the 1980s. Randall concludes that these stock
prices fell relative to the stock prices at other
banks after their problems became common
knowledge; however, they did not decline dur-
ing the periods when the banks were assuming
the relatively high risk that led to losses. Ran-
dall concludes that the stock market does not
discipline the risk assumed by banks, since the
relative declines in bank stock prices did not
precede public information on the consequences
of risk assumed by these banks.
Randall’s study, however, has several weak-
nesses. It is a case study, not a statistical study
of the determinants of stock prices. The dating
of points at which problems became common
knowledge is arbitrary; the choice of such
dates, however, determines the results. About
half of the cases involve banks in the Southwest
We would not expect relative declines in the
stock prices of these banks before the large
decline in oil prices. We cannot expect the par-
ticipants in the market for bank stocks to have
greater foresight in predicting the decline in the
price of oil than the participants in the market
for oil.
Two studies are particularly interesting in
terms of investors’ ability to differentiate among
banks on the basis of risk. Pettway (1980) com-
pares stock prices of large banks that failed
with simulated stock prices that were based on
data from banks of comparable size that did not
fail. Returns to stockholders of the failed banks
declined relative to their simulated returns
about two years before the banks failed. Rela-
tive returns of the failed banks also declined
before the bank supervisors put them on the
problem bank list. Smirlock and Kaufold (1987)
find that, when Mexico announced the morato-
rium on its debt payments in 1982, the declines
in the stock prices were proportional to the
Mexican debt held by banks relative to the book
value of their equity capital. At the time of the
moratorium, banks were not required to dis-
close their loans to other nations. Nevertheless,
investors appeared to have sufficient informa-
tion, without such requirements, to make the
appropriate adjustments to the prices of bank
stocks.
The findings about the relationship between
risk and interest rates on uninsured deposits
and on subordinated debt are more mixed.
‘I’hree of the six studies of bank CD rates report
no evidence that higher CD rates are paid by
banks that assume more risk. Four of the six
studies of the determinants of rates on the sub-
ordinated debt of banks find no significant ef-
fects of risk measures on interest rates.
• for the .tt~f(ètth....~tr~
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In evaluating these results, it is important to
note that, under the procedures followed by
federal bank regulators in recent years, risk has
a more certain implication for bank profits than
for the returns to the holders of uninsured de-
posits or subordinated debt. Losses on bank
assets reduce profits, and if losses force a bank
to fail, the bank shareholders are likely to
receive nothing after the liquidation or sale of
the bank,
Uninsured depositors and holders of subor-
dinated debt, in contrast, receive less than the
principal plus contracted interest only if a bank
fails. In most cases, the failed bank is merged
with another bank, and the surviving banks
assume all liabilities of the failed banks, in-
cluding those in the form of uninsured deposits
and subordinated debt, Most of the cases in
which uninsured depositors and holders of
subordinated debt absorb some losses involve
banks smaller than those included in the studies
described in this paper)9 These observations
are consistent with the conclusion that interest
rates on hank liabilities would be more sensitive
‘~This contrast can be illustrated using some recent studies
and bank failure cases. Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988)
use observations for the 100 largest SHCs, which had total
assets above $3 bUtion in 1985 and 1986. The total assets
of the banks in the sample used by Hannan and Hanweck
(1988) average $4 billion. In 1985 and 1986, 69 failed
banks did not have their liabilities assumed by surviving
banks, Of these 69 failed banks. 66 had total assets tess
than $100 million, while the remaining three had total
assets less than $200 million, The failure of some large
banking organizations in the Southwest, in which the
BHC’s bondholders absorbed losses, occurred after the
periods covered by these studies.to the risk assumed by banks if bank creditors
lost at least part of their principal plus interest
in each bank failure.
The empirical results cannot be used to indicate
the degree of risk that banks would assume if
bank supervisors eliminated various forms of
supervision and regulation, relying instead on
market forces to limit bank risk. To illustrate
such a change in policies, suppose bank super-
visors eliminate capital requirements and restric-
lions on the types of assets that banks may ac-
quire, substituting a requirement that banks issue
subordinated debt. The empirical results do not
tell us whether the probabifity of bank failures
would increase or decrease under such a change
in policies. The only useful information from the
empirical studies is that investors in bank stocks,
who have the strongest incentives to be sensitive
to the risk assumed by banks, are able to dif-
ferentiate among banks on the basis of risk.
This theoretical exercise illustrates how
market forces could limit the incentives for
banks to assume risk. The incentives for banks
to assume relatively high risk are reduced if the
insurance coverage of bank creditors drops
from full to partial coverage. One of the impor-
tant differences among the various approaches
to promoting market discipline of banking risk
involves the vulnerability of banks to runs.
Banks are more vulnerable to runs if depositors
are at risk than if the risks are borne by those
holding long-term bank debt that is subor-
dinated to deposits.
Empirical studies of the effectiveness of
market discipline report mixed results. The
most consistent result is that the stock prices of
individual banks reflect the risk assumed by
banks. Market discipline of such risk would
tend to be more effective if bank creditors were
forced to absorb losses in a more consistent
fashion in hank failure cases.
The empirical studies do not indicate the
degree of r-isk that banks would assume if
deposit insurance were reformed to enhance
the effectiveness of market discipline. Thus, the
empirical studies do not permit us to determine
whether the probability of bank failures would
rise or fall if the current forms of bank regula-
tion were eliminated in favor of market disci-
pline by bank shareholders and creditors.
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